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IMPACT OF ONLINE RENTING ON SOFTWARE PIRACY 
Zeng X. H. (zengxiao@comp.nus.edu.sg), 
Lee, T. S. Y. (tlee@comp.nus.edu.sg), and 
Teo H. H. (teohh@comp.nus.edu.sg). 
ABSTRACT
Online rental of software is emerging as a new way of dissemination for several major software firms. 
Compared to outright selling, the renting scheme delivers the software as a service instead of a 
physical good. Hence, users cannot privately make copies for resale in the market. We investigate the 
impact of the renting mechanism on software piracy and pricing in a two-period model whereby a 
piracy market is present in the second period. We develop and compare models with or without 
renting. Our analysis shows that renting reduces social welfare but helps to increase a vendor’s profit 
under certain conditions. We also assess the difference in outcomes in the presence of network effect. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Online rental of software is increasingly being practiced by some major software companies. For 
instance, since 1996, Microsoft has launched the electronic distribution framework, which allows the 
consumers to pay a monthly fee for accessing the software over Internet. Recently, Microsoft even 
rented its office suite online, allowing people to use Microsoft Word, Excel and PowerPoint on a lease 
agreement. Another example is the application service provider model (ASP), which provides access 
to enterprise applications via the network (see, Delaney 1999). Several technologies such as Citrix and 
Internet2, are emerging to enable remote delivery of software to end users in a scalable and reliable 
fashion.
A distinguishing feature about the online rental mechanism is that the software is installed on vendors’ 
servers instead of end-users’ desktop. Vendors can use monitoring software to ensure no ‘leakage’ 
outside of the lease agreement. Compared to outright selling, vendors could alleviate the problem of 
end-user piracy (private copying) through this mechanism. Piracy has been a perennial problem since 
the advent of the software industry. Particularly, the emergence of Internet makes private copying 
even easier and cheaper. Software that are pirated include personal software to business application 
packages. Business Software Alliance reported $12 billion losses globally from piracy (BSA 1999). 
Moreover, infringement of intellectual property discourages the production of creative works. 
Governments of many countries have enacted compensatory laws to protect publishers and authors. 
For example, in the United States, software piracy is punishable by statutory damages of up to 
$100,000 for each work infringed and may result in a felony conviction. 
We are interested in the impact of online renting on software piracy. In this paper, we treat software as 
a durable product that lasts for two periods, and consider private copying in the second period only. A 
two-period model has been previously used in studying traditional durable goods such as automobile 
and household appliances (Bulow 1982, Purohit 1999). We compare the vendor’s pricing strategy and 
profit with or without renting option, and analyze the consequences for social welfare under each 
option. We also took into account the roles of government policy and network effect. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economics of copying has attracted enormous attention from academics. Research on copying has 
focused mainly on its effects on producer’s strategies and social welfare, and sometimes under 
conditions of network effect. The research stream on producers’ sales and profit identified two main 
effects (Varian 2000). First, piracy will directly reduce demand of legitimate products. Second, 
originals are more valuable when copying is possible. Most argued that the relative cost of producing 
originals and copies is a key determinant in the change of profit. Particularly, profit will decrease 
when private copying is costly (e.g., Liebowitz 1985). These results were obtained under the 
assumption that the producer can price discriminate to capture the values of the copies made from each 
original. In response to piracy, producers could re-examine their decision on production quality level 
(Waldman 1984), extent of protection (Conner 1991), and optimal pricing (Fernando 1988). 
The second research stream focused on social welfare and optimal government policy. Generally, this 
impact is complex. Producers are believed to under-produce in the presence of copying. Improving 
copyright protection might encourage producers to raise production but might induce greater social 
welfare loss due to underutilization (Waldman 1984). Besen et al. (1989) summarized the impact on 
producer and consumer welfare under different assumptions: (1) the extent to which the producer can 
appropriate the consumer surplus; and (2) the substitutability of copies compared to the original.  
The third research stream examined impact on producers’ strategies and social welfare when network 
effect is present. With network effect, the value of the product increases with the number of users. 
Software products tend to exhibit positive network effect. More users might help producers improve 
the product through greater feedback. Common use might also help enhance management techniques 
through standardization and foster higher product visibility. Copying might encourage legitimate sales 
when network effect is strong (Conner 1991) or diffusion of copying is faster (Muller 1995). A 
producer might deliberately facilitate copying to expand the installed base when there is competition 
(e.g., Shy 1999). 
The recent emergence of online rental of software has also attracted some academic attention. 
Choudhary et al. (1998) discussed the benefits of renting in the presence of network externality. 
Gurnani et al. (2001) studied the actual usage behavior of consumers, and concluded that renting could 
expand the market size by tailoring the product to the needs of a particular client. However, most of 
the literature on online rental of software seems to neglect the existence of a piracy market. 
Additionally, little attention is being paid to understanding the link between private copying and the 
distribution mechanism.  
This paper seeks to bridge the gap between the copying and the online rental literature by examining 
the effects of renting on software piracy. Specifically, we explore the following research questions: (i) 
Does renting help counter software piracy, and under what conditions? (ii) What is the optimal pricing 
strategy for the vendor when both selling and renting are used? (iii) How does renting affect social 
welfare? (iv) How do the outcomes change when network effect is present? 
3. THE MODEL
We consider a software product market under a monopolist software vendor. It is a two period model. 
In the first period, the producer both sells and rents, and rental only lasts for one period. In the second 
period, producer sells and faces a copying market. We assume there is Bertrand competition in the 
piracy market, which drives the price to marginal cost. Following this typical assumption on 
information goods, marginal costs are zero in our model. (see Bakos et al.1998) 
Following the market segmentation used in some previous studies (Conner 1991), we assume that 
there is a continuum of consumers indexed by the reservation price ]1,0[?h . Depending on the prices, 
consumers make the optimal decisions according to their preference. In the first period, consumer 
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decides whether to buy or rent or just stay out of the market. Consumers who buy in the first period do 
not need to do anything in the second period, while those who rent or stay out of the market would 
choose to buy the legal product, or to buy pirated copy or do nothing at all. If consumers choose to buy 
and use pirated copies, they may be caught and penalized later. 
We define 1b?  to be the software products sold to the consumers in the first period, r? to be the 
products leased, 2b? to be the legal product sold in the second period, and c? to be the pirated copies. 
Let 1bp , rp , 2bp be the price for 1b? , r? , 2b? , respectively. Note that the price for c? is zero. Let 
( 21 , xx ) be a consumer’s choice, where }0,,{1 rbx ?  represents three choices in the first period – 
buying, renting, doing nothing, respectively; and }0,,{2 rbx ? represents three choices in period two – 
buying 2b? , buying c? , doing nothing, respectively.  
To understand the software vendor’s incentives to provide rental option to control software piracy, we 
compare two cases for the vendor: rental option versus no rental option. For each case, we first 
examine the consumer’s choice and the corresponding surplus functions followed by deriving the 
demand function and the monopolist’s profit.  
3.1. WITHOUT RENTAL OPTION 
In this case, the software provider only sells 1b? in the first period. Consumer decides whether to buy 
it or not. Non-buying consumers might buy 2b? or c? or do nothing in the second period. Space for 
consumer’s choices is represented by {(b, 0) (0, b) (0, c) (0, 0)}.  
We examine the consumer surplus function for each group: (1) For consumer who chooses (b, 0), his 
surplus is 1)0,( )1( bb phV ??? ? , where )1,0(?? is a discount factor. We assume that the surplus 
derived by consuming the product for one period is h , hence for two periods it is h)1( ?? . (2) For 
consumer who first waits and then buys the legal product 2b? , his surplus would be 
)( 2),0( bb phV ?? ? . (3) For consumer who buys the pirated copy, his surplus would be 
)(),0( fdhV c ?? ? ,where )1,0(?d measures the degree of substitutability between the pirated copies 
and the original since they might contain inconsistent/corrupt files or unresolved bugs. f is the 
expected value of fine, which is the probability for a pirated copy user to be caught multiplied by the 
government fine. We assume risk-neutral consumers. (4) For consumer who does nothing in both the 
periods, his surplus would be zero. 
Consumers are then self-selected into different groups according to their reservation price for the 
product. Consumers are assumed to have unit demand. Denote the quantity for each group with Q .
We can derive )0,(bQ  by finding the marginal consumer who is indifferent between choosing (b, 0) and 
(0,b). Let 1h  be the reservation price for this marginal consumer. Since ),0()0,( bb VV ?  is increasing in 
h ( d??? ???1 ), all consumers with 1hh ?  would choose (b, 0) over (0,b). Therefore, 
)0,(bQ would be 11 h? . Similarly we can derive other demand functions for (0,b), (0,c). 
By solving ),0()0,( bb VV ? , ),0(),0( cb VV ? , 0),0( ?cV for h , we can get 211 bb pph ??? ,
d
fp
h b
?
?
?
1
2
2
and
d
f
h ?3 .  We have the following constraints 01 321 ???? hhh . The demand function is 
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1)0,( 1 hQ b ?? , 21),0( hhQ b ?? , and 32),0( hhQ c ?? .                            The monopolist software 
vendor will maximize the profit by setting discriminating prices for both of the periods, 
i.e., ),0(2)0,(1
),( 21
bbbb
pp
QpQpMax
bb
?? ??  subject to 01 321 ???? hhh .
By finding the first order condition with respect to 21 , bb pp , we get 
2
1
,
2
)1(1 *
2
*
1
fd
p
df
p bb
??????? ? , and the optimal demand for each segment are   
)1(2
)2(
2
1
,
)1(2
,
2
1 *
),0(
*
),0(
*
)0,(
dd
df
Q
d
f
QQ cbb ?
???
?
?? . And 
)1(4
)1(
4
1 2*
d
fd
?
???? ?? .
It is showed that when 0?f  there is 0* ),0( ?bQ , so that it is always optimal to sell only in the first 
period. Here, we have proposition 1.
Proposition 1: Government’s penalty enables the producer to version his product for increased 
profitability.
Versioning leads to two results: on one hand, its lower price helps to expand the market by attracting 
some people from buying pirated copy to buying legal product; on the other hand, it cannibalizes sales 
of the superior product in the first period. It is showed that, when 0?f , the loss from cannibalization 
cannot be covered by the benefits gained from the expanded market, therefore product versioning is 
not optimal. When 0?f , the monopolist can differentiate the products more effectively. Particularly, 
we have 0
*
),0( ?
?
?
f
Q b
 and 0
*
?
?
?
f
?
. When 
d
dd
f
?
??
2
)1(
, 0* ),0( ?cQ . Pirated copies will be 
completely driven out of the market. 
3.2 WITH RENTAL OPTION 
We assume that rental exists only in the first period (see Choudhary et al. 1998, Bulow et al. 1982). 
Rental is generally short-term in nature, and thus not considered in the second period. For consumers, 
they can either buy or rent or do nothing in the first period. Some people choose renting over buying 
since it is more affordable ( rb pp ?1 ) or they may just need the software for short-term usage. If he 
rents or does nothing, he might consider buying a legal software or a pirated copy in the second period. 
The surplus obtained from the rental product is rr pkhV ??)0,( , where )1,0(?k  captures utility 
difference between the purchased copy and the rental copy. The rental mechanism might cause some 
inconvenience for users. Space for consumer’s choices would be {(b, 0) (r, b) (r, c) (0, b) (r, 0) (0, c) 
(0, 0)}. The versions of products for these seven groups are sorted from the highest to the lowest given 
the condition that 0????? dkdk ??? , which implies that consumers get more benefits by 
buying than by renting, and the rental products provide more benefits than the pirated copies. Though 
there are seven possible groups, they actually cannot exist simultaneously (Please see the proof in 
Appendix.A). We identified three cases: 
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Case 1: 
dk
dkd
f
?
?
?
???
2
)(
0
Market is segmented to four groups: (1) Buy at the beginning 1)0,( )1( bb phV ??? ? ; (2) Rent then 
buy )( 2),( brbr phpkhV ???? ? ; (3) Rent and nothing rr pkhV ??)0,( ; (4) Copy 
)(),0( fdhV c ?? ? .
Optimal solution for prices are 
2
)1(1*
1
df
pb
???? ? ,
2
)(* dfkpr
??? ? ,
2
1*
2 ?bp ; quantity are 
d
f
dk
f
Q
dk
f
QQQ crbrb ??
??
?
???
)(22
1
,
)(2
,0,
2
1 *
),0(
*
)0,(
*
),(
*
)0,( ?
?
?
?
; and profit is 
)(4
)(
4
)1(
4
1*
dk
fdkfdf
?
?????
?
??????? . It is optimal for the monopolist to sell and rent only in 
the first period and not to sell in the second period ( 0* ),( ?brQ ). Particularly, the 
constraints 01 7654 ????? hhhh  should not be violated. By submitting ),,(
*
2
**
1 brb ppp , we have 
the condition 
dk
dkd
f
?
?
?
???
2
)(
0 .
Case 2: 
d
dd
f
dk
dkd
?
???
?
?
2
)1(
2
)(
?
?
The optimal solution is 
2
1
,
2
,
2
)1(1 *
2
**
1
fd
p
k
p
df
p brb
???????? ? , the optimal quantity is 
2
1*
)0,( ?bQ , 0
*
),( ?brQ ,
)1(2
*
),0(
d
f
Q b ?
? ,
)1(2
)2(
2
1*
),0(
dd
df
Q c ?
??? , and profit 
is
)1(4
)1(
4
1 2*
d
fd
?
???? ?? . Since 0* ),( ?brQ , no renting option is best for the monopolist. 
Case 3: 0?f
The optimal solution is 
2
1
,
2
,
2
)1(1 *
2
**
1
fd
p
k
p
df
p brb
???????? ? , the optimal quantity is 
2
1
,0,
2
1 *
),0(
*
),(
*
),(
*
)0,( ???? ccrbrb QQQQ  and profit is 
4
)1(1* df ???? ?? . Again, when the 
government exacts no penalty, the optimal strategy for the monopolist is to provide only first period 
sales and without renting option. 
3.3. COMPARISON
First, we investigate the impact of offering renting from the standpoint of the software vendor. We 
compare the profit ? of the monopolist with or without renting option. For case 1, 
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0
)1)((4
)(2** ?
??
???
ddk
kfnorentrent
?
???? . And, in cases 2 and 3, profit does not change since it is 
optimal not to offer rental products.  
Proposition 2: The software vendor can increase the profit by offering the rental option only if the 
government penalty satisfies .
2
)(
0
dk
dkd
f
?
?
?
???
When
dk
dkd
f
?
?
?
??
2
)(
, the penalty is high enough to drive out copying; therefore no renting is needed. 
When 0?f , no renting will change the market share of pirated copies. When f is in the 
intermediate range, by introducing a lower version ( 1?? ?k ) product -- the rental product, the 
monopolist expands its market size substantially, attracting not only the consumers who originally buy 
at the second period but also some consumers who would buy the pirated copy. Revenues from renting 
exceed the losses from selling in the second 
period: ?? norentb
norent
b
rent
r
rent
r QpQp
*
),0(
*
2
*
)0,(
* ?
)1)((4
)(2
ddk
kf
??
?
?
??
>0.
Proposition 3: When 
dk
dkd
f
?
?
?
???
2
)(
0 , renting helps more when the penalty is higher and the 
pirated copies approximating closer to the original, that is, 0
)( ** ?
?
??
d
norentrent ??
 and 
0
)( ** ?
?
??
f
norentrent ??
.
The intuition behind is that, when quality of pirated copies is good, the vendor has more incentives to 
offer the renting option to compete against them. Since the higher penalty allows the vendor to price 
discriminate more effectively, the advantage brought by renting becomes obvious. 
Proposition 4: When 
d
dd
f
?
???
2
)1(
0 , the higher the substitutability of pirated copies or rental 
products, the lower the profit of monopolist ( 0
*
?
?
?
d
rent?
, 0
*
?
?
?
k
rent?
); and the higher the penalty 
by government, the higher the profit of monopolist ( 0
*
?
?
?
f
rent?
).
The first two terms are obvious. When the substitutability of the pirated copies is higher, there is more 
competition from the copying market, which reduces the sales of legitimate product more. As the 
government penalty increases the cost of pirated copies, making them less attractive, the provider’s 
loss due to piracy is greatly reduced. The last term means that the version of rental products should not 
be too high since it will cannibalize the sales in the first period. Suppose the condition dk ??  holds, 
the optimal version of rental products should be close to the version of the pirated copies.
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Next, we investigate the impact of renting on social welfare. Following the utilitarian approach by 
Waldman (1991), social welfare is the sum of the surplus of consumers, the profit of vendor, and the 
fine collected by government. We denote the welfare without renting and case 1 with renting with 
rentnorent WW ** , , respectively. Then there is: 
)1(8
)34(
8
)23(3 2*
dd
dffd
W norent
?
?????? ??
)(8
)34(
8
)23(3 2*
dkd
dkffd
W rent
?
???
?
??????
Proposition 5: Introduction of renting will result in the loss of social welfare. That is, 
0
))(1(8
)(2** ?
??
????
dkd
kf
WW norentrent
?
??
.
This is due to the underutilization of the lower version of the rental product. When the rental option is 
introduced, buying consumers in period two would switch to renting. Since this rental product has a 
lower version, the consumer surplus is reduced.  
Proposition 6: The higher the substitutability of pirated copies or rental products, the higher the 
social welfare. ( 0
*
?
?
?
d
W rent
, 0
*
?
?
?
k
W rent
)
Since the higher version of products provides higher utility for consumers, both increasing the version 
of pirated copies and the rental products would benefit the consumers. Therefore, for societal sake, 
software vendors should be encouraged to produce a higher version of the product, say, by improving 
the service in renting. However, we know from the previous result (proposition 4) that the vendor is 
worse off in this way.  
Proposition 7: To maximize social welfare, the optimal penalty by government is 0* ?f .
From proposition 5, we know that renting always results in a social loss. Therefore, renting should not 
be offered for the benefit of society. Since the penalty just prevents people from using the pirated copy, 
it is optimal not to set any penalty. For the case with renting option, we found that the second optimal 
solution
dk
ddk
f
?
?
34
)(*
?
?? . It shows that the penalty should neither be too high nor too low. 
Government can strike a balance between public benefit and the financial incentives of vendor. 
4. MODEL WITH NETWORK EFFECT 
Further, we examine the case when network effect is presented. When there is network effect, the 
greater the number of users, and the higher the value of software product. If a consumer buys 1b? and 
uses it over two periods, his surplus would be )()1( 1)0,( IIIIbb QQeeQphV ?????? ?? , where e 
is the intensity of network effect and IQ , IIQ  are the numbers of copies used in the first period and in 
the second period, separately. Here, we assume that the first period purchaser can get upgrades, thus 
enjoying the network benefit in the second period ( )( III QQe ?? ). Note that in the no renting case 
IQ  is the number of purchasers in the first period while in the renting case it is the number of 
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purchasers plus the number of renters. If consumer rents r? , his surplus would be 
Irr eQpkhV ???)0,( . If consumer buys 2b?  in the second period, his surplus would be 
)()( 2),0( IIIbb QQephV ???? ?? . If consumer buys the pirated copy c? , his surplus would be 
)()(),0( IIIc QQefdhV ???? ?? .
4.1. COMPARISON 
We compare the models with renting or without renting through simulation analyses. We would focus 
on the impact of the network effect on optimal pricing, quantity and profit by arbitrarily setting and 
changing the values of parameters in the model. We show the simulation results when 
9.0?? , 8.0?d , 8.0?k , 05.0?f  in Appendix B. Other parameter values bring only quantitative 
differences. From our simulation results, we can conclude the following propositions.
Proposition 8: The profit and social welfare are increasing with the intensity of network effect in 
both of the case with renting and without renting. 
The network effect raises the utility of the consumers and hence the willingness to pay. Therefore, 
both the software vendor and the consumers are better off. 
Proposition 9: In the presence of network effect, the software vendor’s profit is higher when 
offering renting option. 
Introduction of renting in the first period magnifies the network effect thus allow the product to be 
sold at a higher price (
norent
b
rent
b pp
*
1
*
1 ? ,
norent
b
rent
b pp
*
2
*
2 ? ). The software vendor can effectively 
differentiate the market by selling to the high-type consumers in the first period and leasing then 
selling to the residual consumers. More people would transfer from buying pirated copy to buying or 
renting the legal product in the first period to enjoy the benefit from network effect ( IeQ ). When e is 
high enough, the copying market is totally driven out. 
Proposition 10: With renting option, social welfare is only higher when the network effect is in the 
middle range. 
Renting has two-sided effects on social welfare. On one hand, it raises the social welfare since renting 
is more affordable thus allowing more people to use it. On the other hand, the lower version reduces 
the social welfare due to underutilization. Our simulation results show that, when the network effect is 
at the middle level, the benefit from renting by expanding the market size can outweigh the loss from 
providing the lower version. However, when the network effect is low, or high enough until the whole 
market is covered, it would be best for the society not to use the renting option. 
5. FUTURE RESEARCH EXTENSIONS 
The main focus of this paper is to show that renting is a viable strategy in countering the threat of 
piracy. Vendor’s profit increased with the use of a renting option. We show that, with the introduction 
of renting, some consumers switch from copying to renting, and the software vendor is better off 
renting. However, introduction of renting leads to the loss of social welfare. We show the necessary 
optimal government policy to strike a balance between the vendor and the society. We also extended 
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the model to the case when network effect is present. In this paper, we assume that a monopolist both 
sells and rents the product. Sometimes, the software manufacturer has to rely on intermediaries to 
distribute the product, i.e. a seller and a renter. Further research to investigate the optimal strategies 
under different market structures should be pursued. Additionally, we only consider the monopolist in 
the model. The model can be extended to a duopoly or oligopoly situation in future efforts. 
APPENDIX A 
Proof of market segmentation  
Proof for case 1: when (r, 0) exists, (0,b) will be dominated, and only one of the two groups (r, c), (0,c) can exist. 
(1) If (r, 0) exist, there should be such 0h  that 0)( 0)0,( ?hV r  and )()( 0),0(0)0,( hVhV br ? , which derive 
kpp
k
pp
k
p
br
rbr
2
2 ??
?
?
?
?
?
. Then, for any ,2b
r p
k
p
h ?? there is 0),0( ?bV , and for 
k
p
h r? , there 
is ),0(),( bbr VV ? , so that (0, b) cannot be chosen.  (2) If both (r, c) and (0,c) exist, for people to choose copying, 
there should be such 0h  that 0)( 0).0( ?hV c , )()( 0)0,(0),0( hVhV rc ? , which derive 
k
p
d
f
dk
fp
d
f rr ??
?
?
?
?
?
. However, for any ,
k
p
h r? there is 0),0( ?rV , and for 
d
f
k
p
h r ?? , there is 
)0,(),( rcr VV ? , so that (r, 0) would not be chosen, which contradict with the assumption <Q.E.D>.  Similarly, 
we can prove the market segmentation for cases 2 and 3.  
APPENDIX B  - Simulation results ( 9.0?? , 8.0?d , 8.0?k , 05.0?f )
Figure 1  Profit
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Figure 3  Price (without rent)
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Figure 2  Welfare
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Figure 4  Price (with rent)
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Figure 5  Quantity(without rent)
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